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REPLY BRIEF 
No. 17187 
Respondent'a Brief raises two points of argument that were 
not discussed in Appellant's initial brief. These two points 
are material to the decision of this case but not dispositive. 
The argument set forth by the bank is not meritorious but does 
create an erroneous impression and may cause confusion if not 
adequately dealt with at this time. 
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POINT I 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF) WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PLEAD THE WORD 
"ESTOPPEL" IN ITS COMPLAINT. 
The position taken by Respondent bank at the time the case 
was argued at the conclusion of the evidence and alluded to by 
the lower Court in its corrunents after the case was argued was 
that Plaintiff was precluded from raising the doctrine of 
estoppel because it was not pled. The bank announced this de-
fense only after all of the evidence was in and both sides had 
rested. 
Plaintiff asserted in the lower Court, as on appeal, that 
the bank accepted the conditional check, cashed the same, and 
retained the proceeds and could not thereafter deny its duty 
to release the Trust Deed. 
An elementary question of pleading is raised by the argu-
ment of the bank. That question is whether a Plaintiff must, 
in so many words, raise the doctrine of estoppel in the Com-
plaint and even further, must a Plaintiff use the word "estoppel" 
in a Complaint or be precluded from asserting that doctrine 
at the time of trial? The argument of the bank seems to 
assume that when a Plaintiff sets forth grounds for relief in 
a Complaint that he must also anticipate denials by a Defendant 
and set forth affirmative defenses to those denials in the 
Complaint. This is the concept contended for by the bank and 
is fallacious and not in accord with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule S(a) provides: 
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"Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a 
claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a de-
mand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or 
several different types may be demanded." 
This rule does not require that a pleader anticipate a defense 
or denial and assert in the Complaint an affirmative defense 
to the unstated denial. 
It is well that the Court have before it the claim stated 
by Plaintiff in its Complaint and Amended Complaint. (Record 
80-81) (Record 2) The paragraphs are identical in both the 
Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
"7. On and before January 2, 1974, defendant agreed with 
plaintiff's predecessors to release or reconvey its trust 
deed on the lands described above conditioned on the pay-
ment to it of the sum of $50,000 in partial payment of 
said trust deed note. 
8. On January 2, 1974, plaintiff deposited with Title 
Insurance Agency of Utah the sum of $152,816.98 with 
written instructions concerning the disbursement of said 
sum. One term of the instruction provided that Title 
Insurance Agency of Utah should pay to the defendant the 
sum of $50,000 and to obtain therefore a reconveyance of 
the property described herein and in said trust deed. 
9. In accordance with the instructions given by plaintiff, 
Title Insurance Agency of Utah prepared and delivered to 
defendant its certain check with voucher attached in the 
amount of $50,000. A copy of said check and voucher is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and made a part hereof as 
though fully set forth. 
10. Defendant received and negotiated the $50,000 check 
accepted the funds represented thereby; and still has in 
its possession the voucher portion of the check. 
-3- 1 
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11. Although demand has been made, defendant refused and 
continues to refuse to execute and deliver its instrument 
of reconveyance or other release of the aforesaid trust 
deed in accordance with its agreement. 
12. To assert its lien, although unlawful and contrary 
to its agreement with plaintiff's predecessors, defend-
ant executed a document entitled "Notice of Default" dated 
March 20, 1978. A copy of said Notice of Default is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and made a part hereof 
as though fully set forth. Said Notice of Default was 
recorded in the office of the Grand County Recorder, 
March 31, 1978, in Book 277, Page 435. 
13. Although contrary to its agreement with Plaintiff's 
predecessors, Defendant has threatened to and will, unless 
enjoined and restrained, exervise the power of sale in 
said Trust Deed and after notice for publication offer 
the real property described herein for public sale to the 
highest bidder, all to the damage and detriment of plaintiff. 
The foregoing paragraphs adequately and completely state a claim. 
Further, those paragraphs clearly give rise to estoppel. In ~~ 
stance, it is said that the bank made an agreement; accepted and 
retained the consideration therefore; has reneged on that agree-
ment to the detriment of Plaintiff who changed its position in 
reliance thereon. 
It is without diepute that all of the evidence introduced 
by the Plaintiff in this action materially related to the 
issues raised by the allegations of the Complaint and the legal 
theories associated therewith including estoppel. At trial, no 
objection was made by Respondent that the evidence went to a 
legal theory not pleaded. 
In an analogous situation, our Court has dealt with affirma-
tive defenses raised at trial but not pled by Defendnat. In the 
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case of Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah) the Court stated: 
"[12-15] Plaintiff also raises the procedural point that 
since defendants did not plead the subsequent agreement 
as an affirmative defense, they should not have been 
permitted to rely thereon. It is true, as plaintiff in-
sists, that Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative 
defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is 
to have the issues to be tried clearly framed. But it 
is not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. They must all be look to in the light of their 
even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both 
pleading ad procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What 
they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and 
an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, 
that is all that is required. 1 2 Our rules provide for 
liberality to allow examination into and settlement of 
all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard 
the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time 
meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P., 
so states. It further allows for an amendment to conform 
to the proof after trial or even after judgment, and 
indicates that if the ends of justice so require: "Fail-
ure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial 
of these issues." This idea is conformed by Rule 54 (c) (1), 
U.R.C.P.: "[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." 
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence on the 
issue of subsequent agreement, when it was overruled, 
he made no request for a continuance nor did he make 
any representation to the court that he was taken by 
surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in meeting 
that issue. The trial court not only did not abuse 
his discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and 
receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have 
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to 
do so. 
12. See Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 
P.2d 279. 
-5-
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See also the following cases: 
Cellucci v. Sunn Oil Company, 320 NE2d 919 (Mass.) and 
Greer v. Chelewski, 76 NW 2nd 438 (Neb.), Palmer v. Crews 
Lumber, 519 P2d 269, (Okla.), Farley v. United Pacific Insurance 
Company, 525 P2d. 1003 (Ore .. ) 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE. 
Respondent argues in its brief that the action of Plaintiff 
is barred by the statute of frauds (25-5-1 U.C.A. 1953). Impli~ 
in that argument is the concept that a lien against real property 
can only be released by an instrument in writing because a 
mortgage or trust deed is a conveyance". 
That is not the law in Utah. A mortgage or trust deed on 
real property can be released by parol agreement. 
In the case of Bybee, et al. v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 
P2d. 118, the Court stated: 
"Utah, along with most of the other western states, has long 
been recognized as a 'lien theory' state. Section 60,67,78. 
This court has repeatedly said that a mortgage in this state 
does not vest title in the mortgagee but merely created a 
lien in his favor. Thompson v. Cheeseman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 
477; Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49P. 779; Azzalia v. 
St. Claire, 23 Utah 401, 64 P. 1106; Carlquist v. Coltharp, 
67 Utah 514, 248 P. 481 47 A.L.R. 765; In re Reynolds' 
Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270. These cases are largely 
based on a statutory provision which appears in our 1943 
Code at Sec. 104-57-7 and is as follows: 
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, 
whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the 
mortgage to recover possession of the real property without 
a foreclosure and sale." 
-fi-
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Utah has not passed directly on the issue of whether a release of 
a mortgage comes under the statute of fraud, but given the fact 
that Utah is a lien theory state, then the text and cases over-
welmingly support the view that such lien can be released by 
parol. 
"A difference of opinion, based largely upon the theory of 
the nature of a mortgage, exists as to the application of 
the statute of frauds to an oral agreement to release or 
discharge a mortgage. In those jurisdictions where a 
mortgage is considered as amounting to a lien or security 
merely, it is generally held that a parol release or dis-
charge of, or an agreement to release or discharge a mortgage 
and the discharge of the mortgagor from personal liability 
are not within the statute of frauds .. 
72 A. Jur. 2nd, Statute of Frauds, Section 91. 
See also: 32 ALR 874, Nye v. University Development Company, 179 
SE2nd, 795 (N.C.); Rebold Lumber Company v. Scripture Company, 
279 SW, 586 (Tex.) Kistler v. Latham, 244 SW, 985 (TEX.) 
Additionally, there is ample support for the proposition 
that the check and voucher thereon represented a sufficient writing 
to satisfy the statute of frauds. Formality is not the standard 
in a case such as this. It is sufficient that the check identify 
the transaction, the parties, and the property. ABC Auto Parts 
v. Moran, Mass., 268 N.W. 2d 844 (1971). The requirement of a 
signature is fulfilled by the endorsement of the check by the 
party to be charged. Favor v. Joseph, 16 Ariz. App. 420, 494 P.2d 
370 (1974). A description is adequate "if it identifies the 
property with such particularity that it cannot be confused with 
or claims to apply to any other property" and is no objection that 
it appears on another document, because a deficiency in one may 
-7-
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be cured by reference to the other. Thompson v. Giddings, 
276 P.2d 299 at 233 (Okla., 1954). 
The bank contends that it should not be bound by a machine 
stamped endorsement. Suffice it to say that in this day and age 
that is the way banks communicate, i.e., by machine. 
CONCLUSION 
The contention of the bank that "estoppel" must be stated 
in a pleading before it can be raised as an issue is not the 
law. The Complaint adequately informed the Defendant of the 
nature of the claim and the legal issues arising therefrom. 
Further, the bank raised no objection to any of the evidence 
going to the issue of estoppel. Quite clearly, the lower court 
was confused on this subject. It is obvious from his announced 
decision that confusion on that point as well as others pervaded 
his entire decision as announced from the bench. 
The statute of frauds has no application to this case becaus; 
a mortgage or trust deed in this state can be released, or an 
agreement to release, may be entered into by parol. Additional~. 
the bank accepted the check and voucher which identified the trans· 
action and this writing is sufficient to satisfv the statute. 
One significant point in this case, entirely overlooked 
by Respondent, is the fact that Mr. Hintze admitted that he made 
a mistake by accepting the check. The lower court excused his 
conduct and, in effect, held that the bank was not bound by the 
-8-
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action of it's Senior Vice President. When ordinary people make 
a mistake, no such judicial beneficence is forthcoming. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of this lower 
court be reversed with direction to the lower court to decree the 
release of the Trust Deed. 
GARR~TT 'AND STURDY //'. 
By !i:LJ, ';L_';z!> 
Edward M. Garrett 
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